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Democracy and Administrative Power |  Gulf Newspaper

Democracy and Administrative Power | Gulf Newspaper

The legal representation of the legislature has recently become a source of controversy for the executive branch in the United States, Britain, France and Germany. It focuses on how public policy is developed in these four democracies, its participation in the process of formulating administrative legislation and its need to maintain regulatory legitimacy.
In this work, author Susan Rose Ackermann attempts to convey the worldwide debate on government reform in the countries mentioned above, especially in emerging democracies and post-dictatorial countries. Comparisons related to democratic values ​​and the distinctive features of each organization are political, economic and social enjoyment among the people.
“Authorities are a source of directed jokes and public frustration,” the author says. Critics describe them as a corrupt, arbitrary or incompetent class. Respected reformers dream of governments that operate on the basis of give-and-take with direct public participation. Charismatic leaders avoid established steps to unite the public in support of a cause. The negatives of the word are clear from history and current experience. In practice, charismatic leaders are in power through well-equipped bureaucracies, hierarchical military capabilities and organized local controls. Governments that hold power over time need bureaucratic systems to work with elected politicians; Even critics of the bureaucracy must accept its necessity. The challenge is to create a common law that enhances the democratic accountability of bureaucrats and political appointees.
He adds, “Officers’ technical expertise and experience in organizing events are of paramount importance. However, in a democracy that relies on popular support, it is not enough to give preference to technocrats. Different political perspectives are common in a democracy. Consensus approval for most policy options is not a realistic goal. Sometimes, after informative discussion, almost everyone agrees that a particular policy is the best alternative to the current situation, but serious disagreements generally persist. Consultation is necessary, but nothing progresses if explicit participation processes are to be approved unanimously without time limits. Instead, citizens must acknowledge the institutional framework for making policy choices, realizing that they will not always get the policy decisions they want. Ethical structures that compete for democratic legitimacy must be transparent to the public and not hidden in secret language.
Questions about democracy
The author focuses on four well-established democracies: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. Four case studies represent different forms of representative democracy: two presidential systems (the United States and France) and two parliamentary systems (UK and Germany). France may seem mixed with a directly elected president and prime minister, but in practice it has a strong president. On the other hand, the United States and the United Kingdom have a common legal background, while France and Germany have civil law roots. The whole structure of executive law is related to the formulation of bureaucratic policy. For introductory purposes, the author defines four interrelated issues:
First, why is policy making necessary in the executive branch? Shouldn’t democratic legislatures solve all policy problems in the letter of the law?
Second, even though representation for bureaucracies is a practical reality, how can it function in accordance with democratic principles? How should policymakers balance professional knowledge with openness to public input? It is better to invite public participation, but who should participate, when should participation take place, and how should governments arrange consultations? Will executive law help shape the answers to these questions, or are they purely political choices?
Third, there are many ways to organize the management branch companies and the agencies and groups associated with them. How can these organizational options promote public input and bureaucratic performance? Can private organizations perform certain policy-making functions, and if so, should they comply with the participation and transparent practices of public bodies?
Fourth, how can public law monitor and control the policy class without restricting political administration? What role should courts play in enforcing administrative law requirements?
The answers to these questions in the United States are fundamentally different from those in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, as each country has different common legal traditions. But despite the important differences, the three European countries are generally similar to each other in avoiding American-style competition between the legislative majority and the executive branch, relying heavily on bureaucratic expertise and having greater reliance on public service ethics for professional employees. There are no legal provisions in them, such as the Notice of the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act and the Procedure for Suspension, which explain the reasons for making rules by public consultation and law. At the same time, national courts play an important oversight role in European cases, and EU law imposes additional restrictions on national administrations in member states.
Legal and political differences
The author notes that traditional German administrative law focuses on administrative law (Verwaldungschakt). Here, the legal chain model achieved maximum reliability; It moved from the electorate to the political parties, the prime minister and the elected representatives of the government, and the bureaucracy. “He adds:” French law has a very different view of bureaucratic preference than German law. The French constitution rejects harsh parliamentary government but establishes a strong president. Voters directly elect the president for a five-year term so he can dissolve the National Assembly and hold new parliamentary elections without resigning. The president appoints the prime minister, subject to the approval of the national legislature, but the coalition holds the office until the president has a parliamentary majority. Civil servants use positive legislation and work under a thin layer of political appointees. France, like Germany, does not have a common law governing rules-making procedures.
As for the British situation, he says, “The British Westminster government, following the rules of the past, usually gives the Prime Minister a consistent majority in the House of Commons. Although members of the parliamentary opposition and some members of the House of Representatives object to certain bureaucratic decisions, the Prime Minister can implement the policy choices of the government by providing regulatory documents that are legally binding. Most international security agencies require parliamentary approval, but control of both the House of Commons and the government by a single party or coalition is generally nominal. The Brexit debate has tested the premise of the Westminster model. However, reliance on regulatory tools has not been consolidated. On the contrary, bureaucratic discretion fills many loopholes in Brexit law.

At the U.S. level, “public law in the United States seeks to ensure the political accountability of the process of formulating administrative rules for the American people and direct victims. Causes discriminatory competition.
Even when all three institutions are controlled by one party, the electoral system gives each member of Congress a single electoral district with priorities that do not match those of the President or the leaders of the House and Senate. Therefore, the law usually involves compromises that create vague language and inconsistent rules. As a result, departments and implementing agencies have the broader discretion to explain their responsibilities.
Book system
This book seeks to establish some of the basic principles of common law applicable to democracies everywhere. However, the author is well aware that there are no hard and fast cooking tips for managing tensions on the border between political, professional and public accountability. The teacher handles it differently; In modern countries the formulation of administrative policy is considered a realistic need. It shows how these four democracies deal with this problem, even though some of the proposed reforms contradict traditional models of democratic accountability.
Chapter I provides the basic framework for developing a common law that promotes the democratic exercise of bureaucratic discretion. It distinguishes between three types of rights-based and policy-based accountability performance.
The second chapter deals with the relationship between constitutional frameworks and administrative policy-making, and evaluates the incentives and incentives for accountability in policy-making arising under alternative forms of representative democracy.
The third chapter reviews policy-making processes in the executive branch, focusing on democratic accountability and performance.
Chapter 4 shifts to the more complex nature of independent public authorities and semi-public organizations. It also considers independent agencies that monitor the behavior of public officials.
Chapter Five, moves from process to object, examines the policy evaluation techniques used by professional civil servants and evaluates their relationship with the policies of democratic government. It considers the role of impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis, and discusses ethical structures and their potential for manipulation by groups and politicians interested in achieving narrow discriminatory objectives. The main theme here is that it is impossible to completely isolate the experience from politics; The government must find ways to manage this interaction.
Chapter Sixth considers how public participation can help reduce the legal gap.
Chapter VII deals with the courts, and the author argues that judges should provide oversight without becoming policy makers. In it, the author asks: “Are the courts so determined to avoid interfering in politics that they shy away from any oversight of policy-making power? What policies will enable judges to oversee the process without becoming practical policy dividers?
The author concludes Chapter Eight: “My comparative and ethical analysis, while focused on four countries, is relevant to representative democracies everywhere. The details depend on country-specific facts and legal standards, but the main concerns are more general.
History and law
Despite the deep connection between history and theories of law, these interrelationships are not inevitable. Historical traditions should not prevent reform. Instead, as part of the ongoing struggle to build and strengthen democracy, executive law must focus more on accountability in policy-making.

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